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Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution With Modified Coherent State
Zhen-Qiang Yin, Zheng-Fu Han*, Fang-Wen Sun, Guang-Can Guo
Key Lab of Quantum Information, CAS, USTC, China
(Dated: October 25, 2018)
To beat PNS attack, decoy state quantum key distribution (QKD) based on coherent state has
been studied widely. We present a decoy state QKD protocol with modified coherent state (MCS).
By destruction quantum interference, MCS with fewer multi-photon events can be get, which may
improve key bit rate and security distance of QKD. Through numerical simulation, we show about
2-dB increment on security distance for BB84 protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3], combin-
ing quantum mechanics and conventional cryptography,
allows two distant peers (Alice and Bob) share secret
string of bits, called key. Any eavesdropping attempt
to QKD process will introduce high bit error rate of
the key. By comparing part of the key, Alice and Bob
can catch any eavesdropping attempt. However, most
of QKD protocols, such as BB84, needs single photon
source which is not practical for present technology. Usu-
ally, real-file QKD set-ups [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] use attenuated
laser pulses (weak coherent states) instead. It means the
laser source is equivalent to a laser source that emits n-
photon state |n〉 with probability Pn = µ
n
n! e
−µ,where µ
is average photon number. This photon number Pois-
son distribution stems from the coherent state |√µeiθ〉 of
laser pulse. Therefore, a few multi-photon events in the
laser pulses emitted from Alice open the door of Photon-
Number-Splitting attack (PNS attack) [9, 10, 11] which
makes the whole QKD process insecure. Fortunately, de-
coy state QKD theory [12, 13, 14, 15, 23], as a good solu-
tion to beat PNS attack, has been proposed. And some
prototypes of decoy state QKD have been implemented
[16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. The key point of decoy state
QKD is to calculate the lower bound of counting rate of
single photon pulses (SL1 ) and upper bound of quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of bits generated by single photon
pulses (eU1 ). The tighter these bounds are given; longer
distance and higher key bit rate may be acquired. So a
simple question is how we can increase key bit rate and
security distance of decoy state QKD. Many methods to
solve this question have been presented, including more
decoy states [23], nonorthogonal decoy-state method [24],
photon-number-resolving method [25], herald single pho-
ton source method [26, 27]. Most of these methods are
still based on that photon number statistics obeyed Pois-
son distribution. From derivation of formulas for esti-
mating SL1 and e
U
1 [12, 13], we know that the difference
between the real value of SL1 and e
U
1 origins from the neg-
ligence of multi-photon counts events. Given some new
laser sources which have photon-number statistic distri-
bution with less probability of multi-photon events, a
more precision estimation of SL1 and e
U
1 should be ob-
tained.
In fact, it’s proven that modified coherent state (MCS)
with less probability of multi-photon events could im-
prove the security of QKD by [28]. The scheme of MCS
generation [29] relies on quantum interference to depress
multi-photon events from the coherent state. We can
write the MCS by [28] :
|Ψ〉MCS = Uˆ |α〉 =
∞∑
n=0
Cn|n〉 (1)
with
Uˆ = exp 1
2
(ζ∗aˆ2 − ζaˆ†2) (2)
Cn =
1√
n!µ
( ν
2µ
)n
2
exp
( ν∗
2µ
α2 − |α|
2
2
)
Hn
( α√
2µν
)
(3)
Pn = |Cn|2 (4)
and
µ ≡ cosh(|ζ|), ν ≡ ζ|ζ| sinh(|ζ|), or µ
2 = 1 + |ν|2.
with ζ is proportional to the amplitude of the pump field.
In equation (3), Hn represents the nth-order Hermite
polynomial. When α2 = µν (α2 = 3µν), the two-photon
(three-photon) events have been canceled. In followings,
we always assume α2 = cµν and c is a positive constance.
Like conventional decoy state QKD based on coherent
state, we rewrite the density matrix of the source by in-
troducing the randomization of phase:
|ρν〉 = 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|Ψ〉MCS〈Ψ| = 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Uˆ ||α|eiθ〉〈|α|eiθ |dθ
=
∞∑
n=0
Pn|n〉〈n|
(5)
2Here, we can simply take α, µ, and ν as real number
because the value of Pn only concerns with the module
of them. From equation (5), we can conclude that the
MCS source is a source that emits n-photon state |n〉
with probability Pn.
II. DERIVATION
And now we can deduce formulas for 3-intensity MCS
decoy QKD and 2-intensity MCS one. Through adjusting
the intensities of input coherent states |α〉, we can get
sources of different ν corresponding to different α. Two
different sources of density matrices ρν and ρν′ could be
get by this way. The counting rates for the two sources
(ν < ν′) are given by:
Sν =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(ν)Sn (6)
Sν′ =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(ν
′)Sn (7)
where, Sn represents counting rate for photon number
state |n〉. And quantum bit error rate (QBER) for ν′ is:
Eν′Sν′ =
∞∑
n=0
enPn(ν
′)Sn (8)
In which, en is QBER for the key bits generated by pho-
ton number state |n〉. To derive formulas for SL1 and eU1 ,
it’s necessary to prove that P2(ν
′)
P2(ν)
Pn(ν) 6 Pn(ν
′) for all
of n > 2.
P2(ν
′)
Pn(ν′)
− P2(ν)
Pn(ν)
=
2n−2n!|H2( 1√c )|2
3!|Hn( 1√c )|2
((1 +
1
ν′2
)
n−2
2 − (1 + 1
ν2
)
n−2
2 ) 6 0
(9)
From equation (9), we have proven P2(ν
′)
P2(ν)
Pn(ν) 6 Pn(ν
′).
Now we can deduce the formulas for calculating SL1 :
S(ν′) = P0(ν′)S0 + P1(ν′)S1 + P2(ν′)S2 + P3(ν′)S3 + · · ·
> P0(ν
′)S0 + P1(ν′)S1 +
P2(ν
′)
P2(ν)
∞∑
n=2
Pn(ν)Sn
(10)
Combining with equation (6), we have
SL1 =
(P2(ν)P0(ν
′)− P2(ν′)P0(ν))S0 + P2(ν′)S(ν) − S(ν′)
P2(ν′)P1(ν)− P2(ν)P1(ν′)
(11)
According to equation (8), estimation of eU1 is given by:
eU1 =
(Eν′Sν′ − S0P0(ν
′)
2 )
P1(ν′)SL1
(12)
Now we have get the formulas for calculating SL1 and
eU1 for three-intensity case. In this case Alice randomly
emits laser pulses from source ρν , ρν′ , or doesn’t emit
anything, then Bob can get counting rates for the three
case: Sν , Sν′ and S0. Then Alice and Bob perform error
correction and private amplification by SL1 and e
U
1 calcu-
lated through equation (11) and (12). The lower bound
of security key rate is given by [13]:
RL = q{−Sν′f(Eν′)H2(Eν′) + P1(ν′)SL1 [1−H2(eU1 )]}
(13)
with q = 12 for BB84, f(Eν′) is he bidirectional error
correction efficiency (typically, f(Eν′) = 1.2), and H2 is
the binary Shannon information function.
For two-intensity case, Alice randomly emits laser
pulses from source ρν and ρν′ , then Bob can get counting
rates for the two cases: Sν and S
′
ν . Now, Alice and Bob
can get SU0 firstly, then calculates S
L
1 by equation (14)
with taking SU0 as S0. The formula for calculating S
U
0
can be derived from equation (8) simply, it’s:
SU0 =
2Eν′Sν′
P0(ν′)
(14)
So the formula for two-intensity case is given by:
SL1
=
2(P2(ν)P0(ν
′)− P2(ν′)P0(ν))Eν′Sν′ + P2(ν′)S(ν)− S(ν′)
(P2(ν′)P1(ν)− P2(ν)P1(ν′))P0(ν′)
(15)
To get eU1 , we can assume S
L
0 = 0 and let S0 = S
L
0 ,
then from equation (12) eU1 could be get by:
eU1 =
Eν′Sν′
P1(ν′)SL1
(16)
Equation (11) and (12) are formulas for three-intensity
protocol, while equation (15) and (16) are for two-
intensity protocol. These are main results of our deriva-
tion.
III. IMPROVEMENT FOR DECOY STATE QKD
In this section, our purpose is to show MCS’s improve-
ment for decoy state QKD by numerical simulation. We
consider the case when there is no Eve. And from [15]:
en =
S0
2
+edetηn
Sn
, ηn = 1 − (1 − η)n, η = 10−kL/10ηBob,
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FIG. 1: Couting rate for single-photon laser pulses (S1) verse
fiber length L. Solid curve: real value of counting rate for
single-photon laser pulses for no eavesdropping case. Dashed
curve: SL1 calculated by traditional decoy state QKD based
on coherent state. Dotted-dashed curve: SL1 calculated by
MCS decoy QKD.
Sn = S0+ ηn, where, edet is the probability that the sur-
vived photon hits a wrong detector, η is overall yield and
ηn is yield for photon number state |n〉, k is transmis-
sion fiber loss constance, L is fiber length and ηBob is the
transmittance loss in Bob’s security zone. According to
[8], we set edet = 0.0135, S0 = 8× 10−7, k = 0.2dB/Km
for numerical simulation. We simply set ηBob = 1, be-
cause our purpose is a comparison not absolute distance.
These are our parameters and formulas for numerical sim-
ulation.
A. To Cancel Two-photon Events
Here, we set c = 1 to cancel all two-photon events.
We cannot use equation (11) and (12) immediately for
P2 = 0. But, it’s easy to see that we can replace P2 as P3,
and now the equations are available for this case. Firstly,
we will show the increment of precision for estimating
SL1 . Typically, we set α =
√
0.2, α′ =
√
0.6 as the two
inputs for the MCS generator. With these inputs, one
can get two kinds of MCS with ν = 0.196 and ν′ = 0.53.
Fig1 shows that real S1, S
L
1 calculated by ordinary decoy
state QKD based on coherent state (α =
√
0.2 for decoy
state and α′ =
√
0.6 for signal state) and SL1 calculated
by MCS decoy QKD (ν=0.196 for the decoy state and
ν′=0.53 for the signal state). From Fig1, we can con-
clude that for two-intensity case MCS decoy state QKD
is indeed more effective to calculate SL1 than traditional
decoy state QKD based on coherent state. We found that
in two-intensity protocol the longest length still capable
of estimating SL1 precision increases by 20KM.
Secondly, we compare the key bit rate R of MCS decoy
QKD and QKD based on coherent state. To compare
the two decoy QKD process more fairly, we draw Fig2 in
which each point has optimal value of α and α′ or ν and
ν′ for two-intensity case. But for three-intensity case, we
set the average photon-number of decoy pulses as 0.1 and
ν′ or α′ has optimal value for each point.
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FIG. 2: security key rate (RL) verse fiber length L. Solid
curves: RL with 2-intensity and 3-intensity decoy QKD based
on coherent state. Dashed curves: RL with 2-intensity and
3-intensity MCS decoy QKD.
From Fig2, we see that in two-intensity case about
3KM increment on security distance could be get by us-
ing MCS and in three-intensity case 2KM increment is
given.
B. To Cancel Three-photon Events
Here, we set c = 3 to cancel all two-photon events. And
equation (11) and (12) can be used immediately. Though
MCS without three-photon events has more multi-photon
events than the one without two-photon events, former
has higher total counting rates and lower QBER, which
may increase R. The results are drawn in Fig3. In Fig3,
each point has optimal value of α and α′ or ν and ν′ for
two-intensity case. But for three-intensity case, we set
the average photon-number of decoy pulses is 0.1 and ν′
or alpha′ has optimal value for each point.
From Fig3, we see nearly 2-dB increment is given on
security length both for two states protocol and three
states protocol. This result is better than c = 1 MCS.
We found MCS without three-photon events has higher
counting rates and lower QBER than MCS (c=1). This
is the reason why c = 3 MCS has better performance.
In above discussion, we set c = 1 to cancel two-photon
events or c = 3 to cancel three-photon events. However,
we can also set c as some arbitrary positive value, pro-
vided this value make R rise. And we draw Fig4 in which
the relation of increment of security distance between c
is given. From Fig4, we see optimal c is different for
two-intensity and three intensity cases. For two-intensity
case, the optimal value is 3.3 and for three-intensity it’s
2.8.
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FIG. 3: security key rate (RL) verse fiber length L. Solid
curves: RL with 2-intensity and 3-intensity decoy QKD based
on coherent state. Dashed curves: RL with 2-intensity and
3-intensity MCS decoy QKD.
IV. CONCLUSION
According to above discussion, we see that: thanked
to MCS’s fewer multi-photon events probability, decoy
state with MCS source can indeed provide QKD service
of higher key bit rate and longer distance than before.
We found about 2-dB increment of security distance is
acquired. Generating this kind of MCS laser pulses isn’t
difficult for today’s Lab. We expect that our MCS decoy
QKD scheme could be implemented earlier.
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